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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/04/2004

Accident number: 408

Accident time: 14:05

Accident Date: 13/03/2001

Where it occurred: 3.5 km NE of Tsorina
camp

Country: Eritrea

Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
(survey)
ID original source: BJC

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)
Date of main report: 18/03/2001
Name of source: UNMEE MACC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: AT (unrecorded)

Ground condition: hard
route/path

Date record created: 06/04/2004

Date last modified: 06/04/2004

No of victims: 3

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: 0522487E

Map north: 1620013N

Map scale: H Coy Route Trace

Map series:

Map edition: 4

Map sheet:

Map name: 1: 100,000

Accident Notes
mechanical detonation (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
An IMSMA report on this accident was made available in 2004. Its cursory content is
reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
The organisation involved was the UNMEE MACC itself and the accident occurred when a
“LAV III” vehicle was “trafficking” a route. The incident occurred “3.5 k, North East of Tsorena
Camp in Eritrea on a dirt track”. The accident occurred on a “hardpan road through [a] valley
on [the] North side of existing wadi.
“The route was being recced (again). The Nyala MPV was leading and was approx 50-100m
ahead at the time of the strike.”
In another place it is recorded that “The route was considered a proven route. It had been
trafficked at least five times prior to the strike…. The route had been proven by the Nyala and
trafficked by Bisons”.
A LAV III following the Nyala struck the mine with the right rear intermediate wheel. Force of
explosion destroyed both intermediate tyres. Three pers were in the LAV III and no injuries
were sustained.”
The mine involved was a “suspected blast Anti-Tank” mine, probably a TM-46 or TM-57 but
the report made no confirmation of its identity. The “mine appeared to have been buried
approximately two feet deep”. The accident “occurred on the inside of a curve in the road”.
“Initially it was unclear whether or not this was a UXO or a mine strike.”
“The ground is very hard and it appeared that the road surface had been built up (approx 6”)
off the existing surface.
The crater holes was recorded as having an approximate depth of 0.75m, a diameter of
1.75m and was recorded as “vertical”.
The IMSMA report recorded that three persons were involved but that there were no
casualties. However, under paragraph “E: Effects”, is written:
“E1. Pers Injuries. Minor concussion and emotional injuries. There were three people on
board the LAV III – driver, crew comd and gunner. Two were MOC 031 and the third was an
Inf Lieutenant. It should be noted that all three pers were wearing the TICCS headsets and
none of the crew suffered burst ear drums.”
“E3. Veh Casualties. LAV III c/s 40B (was being operated as c/s 41) lost the right rear
intermediate wheel compl. Right rear and forward intermediate tyres were destroyed. There is
apparent damage to the hull of the vehicle.”
Following the accident “the ERS Section Comd cleared the area and extraction route for
approx 300m using the Minelab detector. The area was marked using red spray paint and
suspicious locations with mine tents. The Nyala MPV was used to recover the LAV III veh cas
to a safe area.
A Technical Advisor at the MACC made it clear that he believed this mine had been placed to
target the recce patrol, which was using MPVs because they knew this might happen.

Victim Report
Victim number: 535

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: driver

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: ear-protectors

Protection used: ear-protectors
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Summary of injuries:
COMMENT
No detailed record was made: shock or concussion.

Victim Report
Victim number: 536

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: other

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: ear-protectors

Protection used: ear-protectors

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT
No detailed record was made: shock or concussion.

Victim Report
Victim number: 537

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: ear-protectors

Protection used: ear-protectors

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT
No detailed record was made: shock or concussion.

Analysis
This accident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident (survey)” because the patrol of Mine
Protected Vehicles (MPVs) was undertaking a “recce”, or survey.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the route was
considered “proven” because vehicles had passed along it before. The uneventful passage of
a vehicle along a route does not equate to clearance in Humanitarian Demining.
The secondary cause of the accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because it seems
that the MACC was deliberately using MPVs as primary clearance tools. It is recognised that
the security situation in the theatre and the assets available may have made this desirable,
but the end result cannot be considered to be clearance to IMAS standards.
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It is possible that the mine had been recently placed on the road to prevent safe passage by
one of the combatants groups in the region. When this occurs, it is not clear that
Humanitarian Demining to IMAS standards can ever be achieved.
The failure of the MACC to record the physical/medical details of the vehicle’s occupants in
any detail was a missed opportunity to add to information about the effectiveness of MPV
armouring systems. For example, it is not clear whether or not the occupants were strapped
into their seats, or whether “concussions” refers to the after-effects of blows to the heads or to
the after-effects of shock-wave transfer.
In discussion with MACC staff, this accident had clearly been considered an “incident” that did
not require the usual accident enquiry.
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